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Abstract 
In the absence of an effective antitrust law, both fare wars and price collusion have 
been pervasive in China‘s airline markets, causing concern for both airlines and 
consumers. A study of monthly airfare data from 2002 to 2004 confirms that fare wars 
occur periodically, as well as price collusion. Both tend to be short-lived. The fact that 
collusion is more likely to occur in January and April when demand is high, as 
revealed by  China Eastern‘s and China Southern‘s price-war and collusion models, 
has been confirmed by interview information obtained from the airlines‘ sales 
managers. However, there is also evidence in these models suggesting that collusion 
can be more easily formed when demand is low. High airport concentration measured 
by the HHI may facilitate collusion in certain circumstances, but it may also lead to 
more price wars under other conditions. Concentration in both airports and routes 
does not appear to systematically affect the occurrence of fare wars and collusion in 
all the models estimated. We also reject the possibility that mutual forbearance due to 
multimarket contact plays any important anti-competitive role in China‘s airline 
markets.   
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1. Introduction 
Price wars in airline markets around the world have been extensively observed and 
reported on by the press. Economic theories have modelled the causes and 
consequences of price wars. The conventional reason advanced for the outbreak of a 
price war is the breakdown of collusion. As collusion is an illegal activity in many 
countries, it is not easy to thoroughly document such behaviour. It is also hard to 
determine when a price war actually starts, and how and when it comes to an end, and 
for what reasons. 
Airfare collusion in China is not a secret and has been widely reported by 
newspapers.
1
 For example, in a report by Chen (2006) titled ―Price Union Suspected 
to have Pushed up Airfare in this Low Season‖ in Information Times (27/03/2006), 
Air China, China Southern and China Eastern admitted to the reporter that they did 
―hold talks‖ from time to time to prevent airfares sliding down to train fare levels.2 As 
a result, since the deregulation of airline prices in 1997, Chinese passengers have 
constantly witnessed overnight across-the-board increases in airfares. In one period, 
passengers enjoy very low prices, while in another they have to pay prices close to the 
full published fares, with little or no discount being available. The absence of an 
effective antitrust law means that such collusive behaviour faces no threat of 
prosecution, as long as the airfare is not more than the published full fare. However, 
in the years since price deregulation, for most of the time passengers have enjoyed 
lower fares than before, thanks to fierce competition among airlines. 
The joint setting of higher prices has been common, but this collusive activity by 
airlines does not simultaneously happen on all routes, and usually does not last for 
long. More frequently, the price agreements collapse and surprisingly low prices 
ensue. Price wars could be discovered in almost all city-pair markets, and led to the 
consolidation of the state-owned trunk airlines in October 2002. One of the main aims 
of these amalgamations, as seen by the General Administration of Civil Aviation of 
China (CAAC) and the relevant merging parties, was to reduce unnecessarily 
destructive competition and produce a more ―orderly‖ market (see Zhang and Round 
(2008) for more details). 
Nevertheless, price wars have still occurred from time to time since the mergers in 
2002, and from route to route, partly reflecting the fact that long-lasting effective 
                                                 
1
 For a collection of China‘s air price discount reports from 2000 to 2006, see the Civil Aviation Net of 
China http://www.carnoc.com/. Local newspapers across the country have extensively reported the 
dramatic airfare changes associated with local cities. 
2
 After being discussed for more than 10 years, China‘s antitrust law was passed in 2007 and came into 
effect from 1 August 2008. Although not targeted by any laws before this, airlines did not appear to 
want to admit to their price-fixing activities. Therefore, they avoided using expressions such as ―price 
fixing‖ or ―price collusion‖, instead frequently using the neutral expression ―price union‖. 
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collusion is notoriously difficult to achieve. For example, Youth Times (2004) reports 
that Air China offered an 80% discount, or 350 yuan (US$44) fare from 15 to 16 
December 2004 on the Shenzhen–Beijing route, whereas previously the discount 
offered was only 30% at most, and the fare was rarely less than 1000 yuan (US$125). 
China Southern and Shenzhen Airlines matched this low price a few hours later and 
all flights in the following days were soon fully booked. However, this short price war 
ended days later after an ―emergency meeting‖ between the sales managers of China 
Southern and Air China. All airlines‘ prices rose to around 50% (875 yuan or 
US$109) of the normal price on 19 December 2004. This pattern of behaviour has 
been repeated on many city-pair routes from time to time in China.  
Price fixing and price war dramas in China‘s airline markets provide an ideal 
opportunity to study collusion and price war issues. Although there have been a small  
number of empirical studies on airfare wars which will be reviewed below, research 
with convincing evidence into collusive activities remains sparse due to the illegal 
nature of collusion and the unavailability of data for the airline industry. What 
differentiates our study from previous studies are its unique data sets and our 
accessibility to airline staff to obtain first-hand opinions on our results and to discover 
information that cannot be revealed by the data alone. Accordingly, this paper seeks to 
discover the patterns of price wars and collusion in China‘s airline markets, and to 
estimate the conditions that facilitate the two phenomena. In the next section, we will 
briefly mention the theoretical models relevant to collusion and price wars. From a 
review of the empirical literature on airline collusion and price wars, we will discuss 
the identification of price wars and price collusion in section three. Section three also 
provides the data and model specification using the factors expected to contribute to 
these two types of extreme pricing behaviour. Section four will analyse the results, 
and conclusions will be drawn in section five. 
2. Theoretical Models of Collusion and Price Wars 
The prominent collusion and price-war studies include the seminal work of Stigler 
(1964) and that of game theorists such as Green and Porter (1984), Abreu, Pearce and 
Stacchetti (1986), Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991), and Slade (1989). Most of the 
game theoretical works have modelled the effect of a change in demand on the 
breakdown of a cartel. Porter‘s (1983) analysis of the Joint Executive Committee 
(JEC) cartel contends that firms with imperfect monitoring can only observe their own 
output and industry-wide price collusion. The trigger price might be activated by an 
unexpected low demand shock or by cheating. Either could result in a period of 
punishment in which each firm produces at Cournot–Nash levels and then resumes a 
collusive phase. The periodical price wars are a result of the firms‘ inability to 
perfectly monitor all the other members‘ behaviour, and are an information cost that a 
cartel must bear. Price wars here should not be seen as the end of the cartel, but rather 
they help the cartel to regain stability. In this model, price wars are thought to be more 
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likely to happen during economic downturns. Ellison (1994) re-examined the JEC 
cartel and provided further findings in support of the Green and Porter theory. 
 
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) show that if demand shocks are observable, price wars 
could happen in an expanding economy due to the lure of the benefits of cheating in 
high demand periods compared with the possible costs of punishment. If the cartel 
could flexibly adjust the agreed-upon price in response to increased demand (by 
lowering prices in booms), cheating would not happen and the cartel would not break 
down. Therefore, price collusion never breaks down, but we can still observe 
fluctuations in cartel prices. This model provides a situation where a competitive 
outcome occurs in an expanding economy. The JEC case was also considered by the 
authors who concluded that price wars occurred in winter periods when the Great 
Lakes are frozen and in the years when grain production is high.  
A theory focused on entry or strategic entry deterrence by incumbents was developed 
by Klemperer (1988, 1989), who acknowledged the existence of the substantial costs 
of switching faced by consumers. To attract consumers, a new entrant will provoke a 
price war by providing a lower price to temporarily compensate consumers for their 
switching costs. Alternatively, a lower price can be seen as an attempt to influence 
consumers‘ expectations, persuading them to switch to an alternative firm by giving 
up their current preference. Once an entrant has locked in its new consumers, the price 
war ends and normal prices resume. Unfortunately for our study, there is not a 
sufficient number of new entrants in the data sets, and so it is impossible to examine 
systematically the effects of entry or entry deterrence on pricing. 
Another relevant model for the airline industry regarding the breakdown of collusion 
is presented by Staiger and Wolak (1992), who support the view that low demand 
leads to a breakdown of collusion resulting from the emergence of excess capacity. 
The war might be ―mild‖ or ―severe‖, depending on the amount of excess capacity. 
The larger the excess capacity, the more severe the price wars. It seems that the 
airlines in China, as in other countries, have historically operated with chronic excess 
capacity,
3
 and this continues to be the case. Therefore it is expected that price wars 
will not be eliminated any time soon. 
These theoretical models together with other collusion theories have provided an 
insightful basis on which to study collusive prices and price warfare. Empirical 
findings in this area to date are of limited relevance to this study because many of 
them are derived from industries that differ significantly from the airline industry. 
Therefore, we confine our attention mainly to the empirical studies on airline 
industries in other countries, and develop from them our price war and collusion 
models. 
                                                 
3
 Tirole (1988) notes that excess capacity might be used as a strategic device to deter entry. 
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3. Definition of price wars and price collusion, model and data 
The identification of a price war is always problematic, owing to the subjectivity and 
arbitrariness of the process. Heil and Helsen (2001) described a set of qualitative 
conditions that could be used to identify a price war, which include: first, the actions 
and reactions largely involve the competitor instead of the consumer; second, pricing 
interplay is undesirable for the competitors; third, no competitors deliberately ignite a 
price war; fourth, the pricing behaviour breaches industry norms; fifth, the pricing 
interaction happens at a much quicker rate than previous interactions; finally, the 
direction of the pricing is downward but such pricing behaviour is not sustainable. 
Most of these conditions are easy to observe and, in fact, most reports in the media on 
price wars are based on observations of these conditions. 
Ross (1997) pointed out that the problem of defining price wars in the US cannot be 
mitigated by the wealth of data available, because the quarterly nature of the data 
from the Origin and Destination Survey in the US does not allow researchers to 
observe instantaneous changes in prices. Morrison and Winston (1996) claimed that 
90% of the fare wars in their samples lasted two or fewer quarters, with an average of 
1.8 quarters on the assumption that any rise in the average fare indicated the end of a 
war, which means that quarterly data are enough to capture fare wars. However, this 
claim may not be justifiable because it ignores price wars that last for just days, a few 
weeks or a month. These short-lived wars would not be revealed by quarterly data. To 
avoid the problem arising from quarterly data, Busse (2002) identified price wars 
according to reports in the press. The use of monthly price data in our study does not 
entirely eliminate the problem as it is still not possible to identify all short-lived price 
wars that stopped within days. Such short price wars are pervasive in China‘s airline 
markets because the explicit or implicit coordination mechanisms among airlines do 
not let any price war last too long. However, by using monthly data, it is believed that 
most major price wars with substantial drops in prices are covered. 
Following Morrison and Winston‘s definition of a price war, the average price of a 
given month is compared with that of the previous month. If there is a price drop from 
the previous month to the current month of more than 20%, a price war is arbitrarily 
said to have occurred in that market. Instead of using their signal that the average fare 
rises by any amount to identify the end of a price war, the end of a price war in this 
study is defined as a period when an increase in the price by 5% (from the previous 
month) is observed in a particular market.  
Ross (1997) raised another problem in identifying price wars, namely, whether it is 
better to compare a given quarter‘s price with that of the previous quarter, or with the 
price in the same quarter in the previous year. The author argued that given the 
seasonal fluctuations occurring in the airline industry, the annual comparison is more 
appropriate. However, this might not be appropriate in our case where mergers caused 
lower price levels in many airline markets in the years following the mergers, as 
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revealed in Zhang and Round (2009a). Therefore, we prefer the approach used by 
Morrison and Winston (1996).  
Levenstein and Suslow (2006) pointed out that most modern case studies surprisingly 
have paid little attention to evaluating the success of cartels, or broadly, of any forms 
of collusion. They surveyed a few studies and reported the existence of three ways to 
measure a successful cartel: the use of price to measure success, a comparison of good 
times against price wars to measure success, and using duration as a proxy for 
success. 
Similarly to the definition of a price war, we define the formation of a collusive price 
agreement as a situation when the average airfare in a given month rises by 20% from 
the previous month.
 4
  Such collusive conduct is assumed to continue to be successful 
until the average airfare drops by 5% or more from the previous month. Again, this 
definition of collusion is subject to arbitrariness. In fact, Levenstein and Suslow 
(2006) mentioned that many cartels are formed following a drop in prices, which 
means that cartel prices might be lower, or at least not higher, than those in the pre-
cartel period. Clearly, our definition of collusion cannot capture the situation where 
the airlines set collusive price levels at a moderate level, i.e., neither extremely high 
nor extremely low. It should also be recognised that falling prices may not necessarily 
mean the failure of a price agreement. They may be the result of independent 
responses to falling demand.
5
 
However, the lack of effective antitrust laws can in fact justify the appropriateness of 
our definition of price collusion in the context of China‘s airline markets. The reason 
for this is that once an agreement has been reached, the price could be expected to go 
up quickly, and once a member has been detected cheating, average prices will drop 
quickly to match these lower fares. The carriers do not have to disguise their price 
cooperation by formulating a moderate agreed-upon price. Therefore, our definition of 
price collusion is likely to capture most of the important collusive agreements that 
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 Feuerstein (2005) noted that ‗[a] possible indicator that could make antitrust authorities suspicious 
that collusion takes place are substantial price movements that do not seem to have an explanation in 
cost or demand shifts. We believe that a 20% change in price could be seen as ‗substantial‘. 
5
 We acknowledge that the change in prices might reflect the mingling of the shift in demand and the 
engagement of collusion. However, as will be discussed later in this paper, our interview information 
revealed that it was a common practice for the airlines to hold talks before the advent of the peak 
season. In this sense, our definition of price collusion does not lose its accuracy. It might also be argued 
that fluctuations in prices are a response to changes in costs. However, this concern can be dismissed in 
our case as an examination of the airlines‘ financial reports reveals that most costs were relatively 
stable during our study period 2002-2004. The only possibly significant shock to this industry might 
have been the rise in fuel prices. However, fuel prices only started to rise significantly in the second 
half of 2004 and so this increase should not pose a serious problem for assessing competitive behaviour 
in the period 2002-2004, even without considering that the airlines could hedge their fuel costs.  
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lead to dramatic changes in airfares in China. In addition, given the ease of engaging 
in price agreements, communication between airlines could be engaged in on a day-
to-day basis, either formally or informally. Even before the beginning of peak 
seasons, it was common for meetings to be held to discuss pricing issues or for the 
airlines to tacitly follow the dominant airline‘s pricing strategy, which means that any 
significant changes in prices were closely associated with the establishment or 
breakdown of a formal or informal agreement. Figure 1 plots the airfares on the route 
from Guangzhou to Hefei for the period 2002 to 2004, giving a  pictorial example of 
how price wars and collusion are identified. Based on our definitions, the periods in 
which price wars and collusion took place are labelled, with the troughs occurring in 
November 2002, July 2003, August 2003 and March 2004 representing the war 
periods,   
A probit equation is employed for the price-war model. The probit model is based on 
our collusion definition in which the dependent variable takes the value of 1 for 
successful price collusion in a given month in a particular market, and 0 otherwise. 
Based on the theoretical insights into price wars, as well as findings in previous 
studies, a number of factors that might induce price wars in China‘s airline markets 
will be included as independent variables. As a price war is the counterpoint of price 
collusion, the same set of factors is also used to investigate the occurrence of price 
collusion. We also discussed these determinants with some major Chinese airlines‘ 
sales managers in Shanghai and they agreed on the relevance of these factors to price 
wars.
6
  To better understand our estimation results, we also discussed our findings 
with the marketing staff of several airlines based in Shanghai, and they largely agreed 
with our interpretations.   
The fare data used for this article came directly from two major Chinese airlines, 
China Eastern and China Southern. The route-level data include average airfares, and 
the number of passengers carried by each of the two airlines on a given route for a 
given month from January 2002 to December 2004. The data were reported as 
directional, which means that each of the pair of route directions can be treated as a 
separate market. In October 2002 the Air China, China Eastern and China Southern 
groups were formed from takeovers of several other relatively inefficient carriers. The 
data sets from China Eastern and China Southern thus enable us to examine the price 
wars and collusion before and after the consolidations.  
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 The interviews were part of the project examining market power issues in China‘s airline market. 
Before interviewing the sales managers, an email stating the purpose of the interview and the interview 
questions were sent to them, with the assurance that their identities would remain anonymous. Six 
airlines‘ station managers or sales staff accepted the interview in 2005. These six airlines included the 
major airlines as well as some local airlines. Most of the interviewees frequently engaged in regular 
meetings with their counterparts from other airlines to discuss all relevant airlines issues, including 
pricing.    
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Due to data unavailability, we cannot include in our study all the routes on which the 
two airlines operated. The final data sets contain 113 markets for China Eastern and 
76 for China Southern. Some of these markets lack information for a few periods 
because of service suspension on some routes from time to time, or due to statistical 
problems.  
Independent Variables 
A framework for price wars was developed by Heil and Helsen (2001), which, they 
argue, provides a guideline for researchers to empirically test for the existence of 
price wars. Such a framework consists of market conditions, firm characteristics, 
product attributes and consumer behaviour, all of which are conducive to the 
emergence of price wars. The conditions that facilitate price wars can also be seen in 
Morrison and Winston (1996), in which they categorised the effects of these 
conditions into two groups: external effects and internal effects. Internal effects come 
from the characteristics of firms and the routes on which they operate, the firms‘ 
reputations, financial conditions and so on, whereas the external economic effects are 
caused by fluctuations in the economy that influence demand and supply. The external 
effects also include seasonal and temporal influences as well as uncertainty. Busse 
(2002) has emphasised the effect of the financial characteristics of airlines on the 
occurrence of price wars. 
Naturally we cannot include all the variables used in previous literature due to the 
unavailability of some data. In particular, given that this study involves airline 
mergers, we pay special attention to the market structure and multimarket contact 
variables that are most likely to have been affected by the 2002 mergers.  
 
 
Market concentration variables 
Stigler (1964) first explored the factors that facilitate effective collusion. He 
concluded that concentrated markets are more likely to produce cooperative outcomes 
than less concentrated ones, as cheating can be more easily detected. It is also 
considered that the gain from cheating is smaller in a concentrated market. In an 
airline market, both route concentration and airport concentration can be expected to 
influence pricing behaviour. It is expected that price wars are less likely to erupt in a 
concentrated market. Concentration can be measured by either market share or the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI).  
The route market share for an airline can be calculated from information on available 
seat numbers published in the Timetable for Chinese Air Carriers, issued by the 
CAAC Chinese Air Carrier Timetable Press every March and October, and from the 
frequency of each airline and the type of aircraft used for each flight.  
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Similarly, airport market share is measured by using the airline‘s total flight share out 
of the airport (to any destination), as suggested by Brueckner (2002). In China the 
market share of a particular airline at the departure airport is more relevant to airfare 
pricing, given that the sales managers of many cities have been empowered to closely 
follow rivals‘ pricing strategies. Therefore, only the airport market share of a carrier at 
the departure airport is included in the airfare equation. 
Multimarket contact 
One salient feature of China‘s airline industry in the post-merger period is the greatly 
enhanced multimarket contact of the big three airlines. The concept of multimarket 
contact, a measure of the situation where the same firms compete in many markets, 
can be traced back to Corwin Edwards (1955). Multimarket contacts give firms 
familiarity with the strategies of their rivals and facilitate their tacit coordination and 
mutual understanding (Scott 1993; Baum and Korn 1996). One of the notable 
theoretical works on multimarket contact by Bernheim and Whinston (1990) supports 
the view that mutual forbearance might exist among firms with multimarket contacts. 
Evans and Kessides (1994) and Singal (1996) find consistent empirical evidence that 
endorses the mutual forbearance hypothesis as being relevant to the airline industry. 
However, other empirical studies report contrary results. Morrison and Winston 
(1996) and Sandler (1998) find that higher multimarket contact leads to intense price 
competition in the US airline market.  
 
Multimarket contact has been measured by a variety of methods. Following 
Heggestad and Rhoades (1978) and other contributions to the multimarket contact 
literature (Jans and Rosenbaum 1995; Evans and Kessides 1994; De Bonis and 
Ferrando 2000), a contact matrix was constructed to measure how many times an 
airline meets other airlines for each of the sample routes in each period of analysis. 
All the airlines present during 2002 to 2004 were included. We refer to the 
previously-mentioned literature for details on the construction of the variable (for 
example, Waldfogel and Wulf 2006).
7
 As before, the domestic timetables were used 
to check the number of times the airlines met each other on each route for each time 
period. 
Symmetry 
Symmetry can refer to different competition dimensions including market shares, 
number of varieties in the product portfolio, cost structure and productive capacities. 
These dimensions exercise an influence on collusion to varying degrees across 
                                                 
7
 A simple example can illustrate the idea. Consider a city-pair route on which three airlines A, B and 
C provide services. Assume that Airline A meets B 40 times and C 40 times, while B meets C 10 times 
in all the markets, then the total number of meet times for the three airlines is 40+40+10=90. The 
number of possible pairings of airlines on this route is 3*(3-2)/2=3. Therefore, the average market 
contact for this route would be 90/3=30.           
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industries. It is generally regarded that firms in a similar market position would find it 
easier to arrive at an agreement that suits all of them. Substantial asymmetry may 
imply a divergence of views between firms and make successful collusion more 
difficult (MacGregor 1906). 
Green and Porter‘s (1984) imperfect monitoring model is not relevant to China‘s 
airline industry, as all the carriers use the same type of reservation system and the 
booking information is almost transparent to each of them. Also, some airlines that 
wish to enforce their price agreements even exchange details on a flight‘s revenue 
immediately after the departure of the flight.
8
 
One may argue that as they are state-owned companies, some Chinese airlines might 
receive different forms of subsidies and thus they are in an advantaged position to 
compete. Asymmetry might arise from such subsidies. It cannot be denied that special 
subsidies to one airline could intensify price competition. However, following 
deregulation in the airline industry, the direct subsidies have been lessened. As far as 
we know, no airline today receives significantly different treatment from the 
government.
9
 Asymmetry arising from subsidies can be excluded from our 
consideration. 
The main asymmetries come from the product differentiation caused by the reputation 
gained from having a safe record, frequent flyer programs, network size, etc. These 
factors may give advantages to some airlines as they lock consumers in. The 
disadvantaged airlines therefore may not be able to achieve their expected revenues at 
the agreed prices, and may find themselves better off by deviating from any collusive 
prices and selling at lower prices. This has actually been the case in China‘s airline 
markets, where many price agreements broke down immediately after they were 
formed. 
We specify airline dummies to indicate whether an airline was serving a particular 
route in a given month. It is expected that the airline dummies can capture most of the 
asymmetries in terms of reputation, network size, frequent flyer programs, etc. For 
China Eastern, in terms of its involvement in price wars and price agreements, the 
most relevant rival airlines are Air China, China Southern, Shanghai Airlines and 
Hainan Airlines. These airlines have a heavy presence in China Eastern‘s sample 
markets. For China Southern, the most relevant rivals are China Eastern, Shanghai 
Airlines, Air China, Shenzhen Airlines and Hainan Airlines, and hence their presence 
is included in the models. 
 
                                                 
8
 Our conversations with some of the airline sales managers in Shanghai show that this is one of the 
enforcement mechanisms employed to prevent cheating. 
9
 The government has helped the airlines through difficult times, however. For example, during the 
SARS period, all airlines were exempted from some taxes.  
 11 
Demand Variable—Number of Passengers Carried 
The review of the cartel and price war theories earlier in this paper reveals one theory 
that suggests collusion is more likely to break down in response to a business-cycle 
downturn in a contracting economy (Green and Porter 1984; Staiger and Wolak 1992; 
Slade 1992). Therefore, price wars are more likely to happen in periods of low 
demand. An opposing theory, which argues that price wars could happen in an 
expanding economy owing to the lure of high benefits from cheating compared with 
the possible costs of punishment, supports a countercyclical pricing pattern 
(Rotemberg and Saloner 1986). Suslow (2005) investigated the stability of cartels by 
looking at 71 international cartel agreements covering 45 industries during the period 
1920–39 in Europe when cartel agreements were legal (these European countries did 
not have antitrust legislation before World War II), and found that a cartel is more 
likely fall apart during economic downturns and in the presence of economic 
volatility. It seems that frequent macroeconomic fluctuations increase the possibility 
of the collapse of a cartel (Carlton and Perloff 2005). 
The demand variable included in our model is the number of passengers carried by 
China Eastern (China Southern) in a particular market for a given month. An 
endogeneity problem arises with this variable due to the fact that in a price war, the 
number of passengers carried by each airline is likely to increase, while a higher 
collusive price would make the air travel less attractive.  To circumvent the 
endogeneity problem, population, disposable income and the number of carriers were 
used as instruments, following the approaches of Dresner and Tretheway (1992), 
Fischer and Kamerschen (2003), and  Busse (2002).  The population and the GDP per 
capita of China‘s cities come from China City Statistics Yearbook (2004). The 
geometric means of the populations and of GDP per capita for both route endpoint 
cities are used. The number of carriers can be obtained from the airline timetables. 
 
Busy Airport Dummy 
A dummy variable is specified for the airports that handled more than 10 million 
passengers in 2004 from which the flights depart (source: China Civil Aviation 
Statistics 2005). Airports in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Chengdu 
meet this criterion. These airports are usually congested in terms of take-off and 
landing slots and the use of airport facilities, and therefore a fare premium may arise 
but not necessarily imply market power per se (Levine 1987; Tretheway and Kincaid 
2005). Price wars have also been found to be less likely to occur in the markets 
associated with these busy airports (Morrison and Winston 1996). It is expected that 
unilateral effects would seem to be less likely at these airports and coordinated effects 
would appear to be more possible. 
Hub-to-Hub Market Dummy 
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Hub-to-hub markets are those where an airline has control over some of the airport 
facilities at both terminal airports of a particular route. More specifically, the two 
airports are the airline‘s primary, or one of its secondary, hubs. For example, after the 
mergers, China Eastern Group‘s primary and secondary hubs included: Shanghai, 
Jinan, Nanchang, Taiyuan, Hefei, Ningbo, Lanzhou, Nanjing, Wuhan, Xi‘an and 
Kunming (source: China Eastern‘s website, available at www.ce-air.com). The China 
Southern group owns the following primary and secondary hubs: Guangzhou, 
Urumqi, Shenyang, Harbin, Changchun, Dalian, Shenzhen, Haikou, Zhengzhou, 
Wuhan, Changsha, Nanning, Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shantou and Guiyang (source: China 
Southern‘s website, available at www.cs-air.com). A market linking an airline‘s 
primary or secondary hubs is defined as a hub-to-hub market. A dummy with value 1 
indicates such a market, and takes the value 0 otherwise. It is expected that an airline 
operating in its hub-to-hub markets has the abilities to lead both collusion and price 
wars.   
Tourist route, month, Year, SARS variables 
Traditionally, Guilin, Haikou, Sanya, Zhangjiajie, Huangshan, Hangzhou and 
Wuyishan are regarded as typical tourist cites whose economic growth is heavily 
dependent on the tourism industry. A vacation dummy was introduced in our price 
war and collusion models to allow for the effects of tourist markets. Year dummies 
and month dummies are included in our models. June is used as the benchmark 
category as our interviews suggested that it is usually regarded as a shoulder season. 
The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) pandemic broke out in 2003 and 
affected the airline industry significantly, especially during its peak period in May-
June 2003. To control for this unusual period, a SARS dummy is included. 
A summary of the dependent and independent variables and their descriptive statistics 
is provided in Tables 1 and 2. 
4. Results and Analysis 
It should be noted that price wars and collusion in China‘s airline markets largely 
occurred on a route-by-route basis. There has not been a case where a price war or 
collusive price rise occurred simultaneously between the two carriers in all the 
markets they served. This is because pricing decisions were decentralised to the 
station managers or even the marketing staff at an airport who could closely monitor 
and respond promptly to rival airlines‘ prices. Therefore, once an airline significantly 
cuts the price on a particular route, almost all the airlines that operate on that route 
will match the price and get involved. Zhang and Round (2009a) have reported that 
almost identical prices were charged by China Eastern and China Southern on the 
same routes during 2002-2004.   
Based on the definition of price wars and price collusion discussed earlier, the average 
fall when China Eastern participated in a price war, and the average increase when it 
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engaged in a price-fixing collusion, was 26% and 31%, respectively, and 28 % and 35 
%, respectively, when China Southern did so. Figures 2 and 3 show that neither price 
wars nor price collusion lasted long. Typically 74% and 86% of the collusions in 
which China Eastern and China Southern participated, respectively, broke down 
within one month, while 59% and 69% of the price wars that the two airlines were 
involved in also ended within one month. The average duration of a price war was 1.7 
months for China Eastern and 1.5 for China Southern. This is very different from the 
findings of Morrison and Winston (1996), who claimed that nearly 90% of the fare 
wars lasted two or fewer quarters with an average duration of 1.8 quarters. The price 
collusions in our study seem to be shorter lived than price wars, with an average of 
1.5 months for China Eastern and 1.4 for China Southern. However, it can also be 
seen in the figures that there was a small number of instances where collusion lasted 
for more than two months. Longer duration is an indicator of successful collusion. 
In a country where antitrust laws make explicit pricing agreements illegal and 
collusion can only be achieved implicitly through repeated interactions, firms might 
use the lessons they learned from past experience and act cautiously in upsetting an 
implicit collusion, as they do not know whether they can quickly establish another 
one. However, given that the price agreements in China were not totally illegal and 
could be achieved in many ways, a price agreement could be established quickly any 
time the airlines wished. If one of the members was not happy with the outcome of an 
agreement, collusion could quickly break down because of the lack of an effective 
enforcement mechanism, but it was easy enough to form another one soon thereafter. 
This might explain why price wars and price collusion in China have tended to be 
short-lived. 
The natural questions are how a price war started and how it ended in China‘s airline 
markets. Without resorting to in-depth interviews with the relevant parties, the true 
causes may never be established by merely relying on statistical data. In fact, as the 
services provided by different airlines are not perfectly substitutable, there will always 
be a relatively disadvantaged airline that has lower revenue on a route than that of 
other members of the collusive group. In most instances, the only choice for a 
disadvantaged airline to increase its total revenue is to cut prices (owing to the elastic 
demand at the agreed price level). When all the airlines follow suit, a price war will 
break out.  
The base airline (with headquarters in the city) usually plays an important role in 
coordinating an agreement to end the war on the route out of that city. Our 
interviewees all expressed the view that the base airline should take the responsibility 
to call all the relevant parties in for talks. If this did not work, the station managers 
would report the case to their own top management for action, and communication at 
senior levels could then terminate a war. This suggests that, quite often, the end of a 
war implies the formation of a collusive agreement. In this sense, price wars could be 
interpreted as a means to enforce collusive agreements, sometimes leading to a more 
stable agreement after lessons had been learned.  
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One strategy used by the airlines to keep a collusive agreement alive, according to our 
interviews, is to design a plan to accommodate the disadvantaged carrier on a route. 
For example, the main carriers could allow the disadvantaged airline to sell at a lower 
price level, say 10 % lower, while others stick to the agreed price, so that all airlines 
can have roughly equal revenue in a particular market proportional to the number of 
seats that each carrier offers. Our data indicate that there was a slight increase in the 
duration of collusive agreements in 2004. Our interviews suggested that in 2005 on a 
small number of routes, the agreements using such approach were quite successful. 
However, given that any collusive contract could not cover all the aspects of the 
participants‘ interests and that the outside conditions on a particular route changed 
from time to time, it was the norm for agreements to collapse frequently, followed by 
a new one formed soon after the price wars, with new additional conditions to suit 
each individual airline‘s needs.  
The different goals of airlines on a particular route could also be one of the causes of 
price wars and explain the irrational behaviour observed during these wars.  The big 
three airlines had much less trouble than the local airlines in making profits due to 
their widespread networks which made cross-subsidising possible.  Our interviewees 
emphasised that once price wars broke out, the large airlines could be more irrational 
if the markets concerned were not their main profit earners, but they were the main 
sources of revenue for the local airlines. On these routes, the major airlines‘ goals 
could be quite different from those of the local airlines. They may simply want to 
enhance or maintain their market shares, and so the large airlines could start a war on 
these routes and set the price at unexpectedly low levels. 
For most cases, price wars were begun by an airline with a relatively small market 
share and a poor load factor.  For airlines that dominated the routes, they most likely 
responded by cutting their prices, but these prices could remain at least 5% higher 
than those of the low market share carriers, as they would know that their larger 
frequencies could offer more flexibility and so they would retain the patronage of 
most of their passengers. Repeated wars of this kind have led to the larger airlines 
agreeing to the small market share carriers charging slightly lower prices when 
negotiating new agreements, as discussed earlier. 
The difficulties in enforcing collusive airline agreements are considerable, given the 
need to cater for different groups of passengers. For example, the cheaters could 
disguise their price cuts in the name of discounts offered to tourist groups. Thus, a 
booking for a group appears to be for a return tourist trip, but the cheating airline may 
cancel their return flight after the outbound flight departs. These passengers are in fact 
not tourists but have been given tour group prices. However, such behaviour could be 
revealed in some way to rival airlines by the travel agent or the passengers, and a 
price war would soon follow. Given the lack of effective punishments to impose on 
cheaters,  apart from price wars, our interviewees claim that the negotiation and 
coordination abilities of the sales managers are the key to preventing wars and 
maintaining the price agreements for a long time.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
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Given the somewhat arbitrary nature of our definition of price wars and collusion, we 
then tried alternative definitions of price wars and collusion. The duration of the two 
pricing behaviours are reported in Figures 4 and 5. Awar1 represents the beginning of 
a price war when the price has decreased by 15% from the previous month and an end 
of the war when the monthly average price has gone up by 10% from the previous 
month (or when the accumulated increases reach 10% in the previous consecutive 
months
10
). Awar2 alternatively defines a price war with the necessary decrease being 
measured as 25% and the increase being 10%. Similarly, we have two definitions for 
collusion corresponding to Awar1 and Awar2 respectively.  
Our conclusion does not change significantly with the alternative definitions as shown 
in Figures 4 and 5, as the majority of the price wars and collusive conduct episodes 
still tend to last only one or two months, especially in China Southern‘s markets.  
Figures 6 and 7 present the number of price wars and the number of instances of 
collusion that were present in China Eastern‘s sample markets from January 2002 
through to December 2004. Figure 6 is based on the base definition of price wars and 
collusion that we discussed in section three, i.e., a 20% decrease (increase) at the 
beginning and a 5% increase (decrease) at the end. The discontinuity in August 2002 
is due to missing data for China Eastern on all its routes. Figure 7 comes from the 
alternative definitions just discussed. Both price wars and collusion appear to have 
occurred more frequently after the airline mergers in October 2002 in China Eastern‘s 
markets. Generally similar patterns can be found in Figures 8 and 9 for China 
Southern. Although we find that price wars and price collusion coexisted for most of 
the periods, generally, when the frequency of price wars was high, the number of 
collusive episodes in the sample markets was low, suggesting seasonal demand 
changes could be an important factor eliciting the collapse of a collusive agreement.  
The results of the price war and collusion models for China Eastern are reported in 
Table 3 and those for China Southern are given in Table 4. 
11
 The interpretation of 
probit coefficients is not analogous to the corresponding coefficients obtained by 
linear regression models. The magnitude of each coefficient is not especially useful in 
a practical sense. Therefore, the marginal effect (or partial effect), which shows the 
effect of an infinitesimal change in a continuous independent variable on the 
probability of a price war or collusion, is usually reported. In the case of a non-
continuous variable, such as a dummy variable, the marginal effect reports the 
discrete change in the probability of this dummy variable changing from 0 to 1. The 
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 In some cases, the price increases by 3%, 4%, and 5% in three consecutive months rather than by 
10% in one month. In these cases, we consider the price war ends in the third month.  
11
 Only the results using the base definition of price wars and collusion are reported, as we believe that, 
based on the work experience of one of the authors in the Chinese airline industry, the base definition is 
more representative of the actual facts. The models were estimated using Stata command ―ivprobit‖ 
with  a maximum likelihood estimation method. 
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marginal effects of the significant variables provided in the two tables were computed 
at the means of the independent variables.
12
 For each model, the Wald test statistic 
shows that the hypothesis that all the coefficients are simultaneously zero can be 
rejected at the 1% significance level.
13
 
 
In our data sets, the number of passengers variable reflects demand fluctuations both 
across routes and over time. This may not correspond to the theoretical models of 
price wars in Green and Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), whose 
models seem to pertain only to demand fluctuations over time. Although not entirely 
comparable, the negative sign in the price-war model for China Southern gives some 
support to the view of Green and Porter that a price war is more likely to erupt when 
demand is low.
14
 Also, the collusion model (China Southern) shows that successful 
collusion is less likely to be maintained in a market where demand is high. This seems 
to be consistent with the conclusion in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) that collusion is 
hard to maintain in booms. The results of the passenger variable suggest that both 
price wars and price collusion could happen in a low demand period or in a market 
where air travel demand is relatively low. It could also be the case that when demand 
was low, some routes were experiencing price wars, while some others were engaging 
in price-fixing activities.  
The seasonal effects as well as the effect of the SARS dummy provide further 
evidence that demand fluctuations have an impact on the airlines‘ pricing behaviour. 
Compared with the shoulder season in June, peak seasons such as January (before the 
Chinese New Year) and April (before the week-long holiday for Labour Day)  in all 
the models show that an inference can be made about a strong tendency towards 
collusion and less likelihood of a price war. Our interviews suggest that the airlines 
are well aware of the times of peak and low seasons. The incentive to coordinate 
pricing during high seasons is stronger as they believe that the profits in this period 
can cover the losses in the low seasons. Therefore, it was common practice for the 
sales managers to meet before the advent of the peak season to form an agreement, as 
they understood that if they lost peak time revenues, they would suffer losses for the 
whole year, Therefore, most of airlines observed the agreements quite closely when 
                                                 
12
 For example, in China Eastern‘s price-war model, the tourism routes have a 4% higher probability of 
experiencing a price war (at the means of the independent variables). 
13
 To avoid the coefficient being too small in magnitude, we rescaled the oapthhi, distance and 
paxnovariables by dividing them by 100. The rescaling will not affect the interpretation of the results 
(Wooldridge 2006). 
14
 A similar conclusion in support of Green and Porter (1984) was arrived at by Brander and Zhang 
(1993) who included a macroeconomic variable (real GNP) in their regression and found that it had a 
significant positive effect on the collusive conduct of United Airlines.  
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demand was high, even though this sometimes meant that the flights were not full.
15
 
This again supports the view of Green and Porter (1984). However, coefficients on the 
SARS dummy suggest that when air travel demand was extremely low, the probability 
of collusion significantly increased for both China Eastern and China Southern. As a 
result, the likelihood of price wars occurring was reduced. This seems to be consistent 
with the rationale presented in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). 
Another week-long holiday (1-7 October) does not appear to induce more collusive 
activities, but the two price-war models show that the chance of getting into a war is 
diminished in October as well as September for China Southern. For China Eastern, 
more price wars could be seen in November, which confirms our interview 
information. For China Southern, as well as January, April, September and October, 
price wars are also less likely in December. This can be explained by the vicinity of 
its headquarters (Guangzhou) to Hong Kong where Christmas is the public holiday.     
The year dummies reveal that compared with 2002, both China Eastern and China 
Southern tended to participate in more collusive agreements in 2003 and 2004 (but not 
significantly for the 2003 dummy in China Eastern‘s collusion model), after the 
airline mergers. This has already been observed in Figures 6-9. Only China Eastern 
appears to engage in more price wars in 2003 at the 5% significance level. If we could 
assume that most of the collusive agreements would last for a long time, then most 
likely we would have seen price increases in 2003 and 2004. However, a previous 
study (Zhang and Round 2009a) has shown that on average, 2003 and 2004 
experienced substantial drops in airfares on most routes compared with 2002.  
The contradictory results suggest that although the reduction in the number of 
competitors following the mergers would have facilitated the negotiation of price 
agreements, most were not effectively enforced and quickly died out. Not 
surprisingly, the declining trend in airfares was not changed by any more frequent 
engagement in collusion. 
It is understandable that Air China, with its business mainly centered on international 
routes, tended to be reluctant to engage in fare wars in its domestic markets. Shanghai 
Airlines, a strong competitor on many routes out of Shanghai, which shares the same 
base airport with China Eastern, might be very familiar with China Eastern‘s 
operations and thus mutual forbearance and convenient communication might have 
helped them avoid destructive competition. The presence of China Eastern on China 
Southern‘s routes increased the likelihood of both price wars and price collusion at the 
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A recent collusion episode also happened in April 2009 when all the airlines announced the use of a 
new airfare calculation formula from 20 April 2009, which led to various increases in prices for all the 
carriers in the domestic markets. This obvious price-fixing activity has drawn the attention of the newly 
established antitrust authority under the new Anti-Monopoly Law.  
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10% and 5% significance levels respectively, indicating that these two airlines, of 
similar size, fought against one another fiercely in one period and cooperated in 
harmony in another period, or competed on some routes and colluded on others. Table 
3 also shows that the presence of China Southern in China Eastern‘s markets could 
intensify competition between the two carriers.  
The presence of Hainan Airlines did not induce more price wars in China Eastern‘s 
sample markets. However, its presence could increase the likelihood for China 
Southern to engage in price wars. This finding is not surprising as Zhang and Round 
(2009b) found that Hainan Airlines has had the effect of disciplining the major 
airlines in pricing, especially for China Southern, as the primary bases of the two 
airlines are geographically quite close. Departures from one of the top 5 busiest 
airports would be more likely to see a price war in China Eastern‘s sample markets, 
but the presence of a busy airport did not have any serious impact on airline 
cooperation. However, this is not to say that collusion did not happen in the markets 
departing from these cities. It is possible that that markets associated with these cities 
are crucial to the airlines involved in terms of generating large amounts of revenue, 
and therefore it is in every player‘s interest to keep airfares in these markets as high 
and stable as possible through collusion. Without dramatic changes in prices, our 
measurement of collusion cannot capture such types of price cooperation. 
The tourism markets of both China Eastern and China Southern experienced more 
price wars, reflecting higher elasticities of travellers‘ demands on this type of 
route.The tourism routes had little effect on the likelihood of forming a price union, as 
disclosed by the price collusion models of the two airlines. 
In China Southern‘s hub-to-hub markets, price wars seemed to be less likely to occur. 
China Southern‘s price-war model shows that longer routes were more likely to 
experience price wars. One possible reason could be that relatively low personal 
disposable income in many areas of China constrains the use of air transport for long-
distance travel (in fact, for the vast majority of the population, travel by train is the 
first choice, especially when long-distance travel is very expensive). An additional 
possible reason is that longer routes are usually associated with a route involving a 
rival‘s hub airport, and thus competition tends to be strong. In contrast, shorter routes 
are usually within an airline‘s sphere of influence and a certain degree of market 
power could be exercised. The sign of the distance variable is also positive in China 
Eastern‘s price-war model, but it is not statistically significant. For collusion models, 
the distance variable did not have a significant effect. 
We move now to the concentration measures. For China Eastern, an increase in 
departure airport HHI, on the one hand, increased the likelihood of price wars (at the 
10% significance level). On the other hand, it also increased the likelihood of a 
successful price agreement (at the 1% significance level). These findings once again 
are not conflicting. Rather, it is very likely that when there is a price war, price 
collusion follows in the same market. The market share at the departure airport seems 
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to have no significant impact on the price wars and collusion. Although economic 
theory suggests that collusion is more likely to occur in concentrated markets, we 
have not generally found this result in all the models we have estimated. This is 
consistent with the survey conducted by Levenstein and Suslow (2006) who conclude 
that there is no simple relationship between industry concentration and the likelihood 
of collusion. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that firms in China‘s 
concentrated airline markets had the ability to alleviate price fluctuations, or to 
collude with a moderate pricing strategy, and perhaps on other competitive variables 
such as flight schedules and capacity that cannot be captured by our price- war and 
collusion models. 
Finally, any increase in multimarket contact had no significant effect for China 
Eastern in terms of its engagement in either price wars or collusion. This variable, 
however, indicates that China Southern was more likely to get involved in a price war 
at the 5% significance level. This contradicts the traditional mutual forbearance 
hypothesis, but is consistent with the findings of Morrison and Winston (1996). They 
give the explanation that although multimarket contact might facilitate carrier 
cooperation that reduces the chance of price wars, it can also facilitate the spread of 
price wars once the cooperation breaks down. This might also be true in China‘s 
airline market. As well, owing to the strong rivalry in China‘s airline markets, explicit 
price-fixing agreements generally could not be expected to last long, let alone any 
implicit collusion implied by mutual forbearance. In addition, airline pricing decisions 
are generally made locally. A successful and stable collusion is largely dependent on 
the negotiation skills of the local sales managers as noted earlier, and these will reflect 
each individual‘s self-interest. Under these circumstances, mutual forbearance or 
implicit collusion across the board is quite difficult to achieve. 
5. Conclusion 
Identifying and generalizing the factors that sustain successful collusion continues to 
be a difficult, but important research topic, especially in emerging markets such as 
China, where the new antitrust authorities urgently need rigorous analysis of this 
phenomenon to have a better understanding of the mechanisms of collusion in 
different contexts. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first academic paper 
that documents price wars and collusion in China‘s airline markets, which many 
Chinese consumers have experienced and observed. By using monthly fare data to 
study the period from 2002 to 2004, during which airline consolidations eliminated 
many trunk and local airlines, it has been found that the occurrence of price wars was 
not tempered by the mergers. Fare wars occurred periodically across routes, but price 
collusion was still prevalent.
16
 However, both tended to be short-lived. Our interview 
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 Note that we say it is ―prevalent‖ because, compared with other airline markets, price collusion in 
China‘s markets has been frequently observed. It does not literally mean that collusive conduct occurs 
simultaneously in most of the airline markets. 
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information obtained from airline staff reveals the importance of changes in demand 
in inducing or promoting collusion in China. Although it is almost certain that airlines 
tended to engage in collusion when demand was high, there is also evidence from our 
price-war and collusion models which suggests that collusion could happen during 
low demand periods.   
It should be pointed out that most of our explanatory variables did not have 
consistently significant effects on the occurrence of price wars or price collusion 
engaged in by both China Eastern and China Southern. For example, high airport 
concentration measured by HHI may facilitate collusion in certain circumstances, but 
it may also lead to more price wars under other conditions.  The rejection of the 
existence of mutual forbearance owing to multimarket contact demonstrates that in 
dealing with airline merger cases, at least in China, there seems to be no major need to 
attach too much attention to the potential anticompetitive impacts of this variable, in 
contrast to previous claims made by many economists. It is, therefore, hard to 
generalise a set of factors that facilitate price wars or collusion as people might like to 
see. This reflects the nature of oligopolistic interdependence where any outcome 
could be possible, as reflected by numerous theoretical game models using different 
assumptions about firm behaviour and responses to rivals‘ strategies. Therefore, it is 
recommended that caution is needed in approving or rejecting proposed mergers, at 
least in China‘s airline industry, especially if using a ―checklist‖ of the factors (for 
example, the factors listed in the Australian Merger Guidelines
17
) thought to be 
necessary to consider assessing the anticompetitive effects of a proposed merger.  
The short-lived collusive agreements reported in our paper might represent different 
policy challenges compared with those needed to deal with the relatively long-
livedcartels identified by Porter (1983), as well as other international cartels surveyed 
in Levenstein and Suslow (2006).  However, our study also shows that a small 
number of markets had consistently higher prices for a relatively long time. Stable 
collusion may exist in a few markets that are vital to profits of the relevant airlines. 
More dangerously, if the skills of cooperative negotiations improve, and if efficient 
enforcement mechanisms can be developed, price agreements could become long-
lived. China thus needs an operationally-effective modern antitrust law in order to 
develop a culture for competition, and to ban any implicit and explicit collusion 
between rival firms throughout the economy. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for China Eastern’s data 
Variable  Description  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
War  War = 1 if China Eastern is experiencing a price war  3266 0.051 0.219 0 1 
Collusion collusion = 1 if China Eastern is participating in collusion 3266 0.081 0.273 0 1 
oaptshare market share for China Eastern at departure airport 4068 0.244 0.145 0 0.829 
oapthhi Herfindahl–Hirschman index of departure airport 4068 2723.715 1148.535 1261.177 7844.215 
murouteshare share of China Eastern in a route market 4068 0.406 0.252 0 1 
mnc average route market contact 4068 36.517 24.779 0 115 
distance route distance 4068 1180.593 577.040 160 3649 
tourismroute tourismroute = 1 if a market is a tourism market 4068 0.212 0.409 0 1 
busyapt busiapt = 1 if the departure airport is one of the 10 busiest airports 4068 0.531 0.499 0 1 
hubtohub hubtohub = 1 if a market links China Eastern‘s primary or 
secondary hubs  
4068 0.124 0.330 0 1 
sarsdummy Sarsdummy = 1 for periods of May and June 2003  4068 0.056 0.229 0 1 
ca ca = 1 if Air China is present in a market 4068 0.204 0.403 0 1 
cz cz = 1 if China Southern is present in a market 4068 0.290 0.454 0 1 
fm fm = 1 if Shanghai Airlines is present in a market 4068 0.260 0.439 0 1 
hu hu = 1 if Hainan Airlines is present in a market 4068 0.171 0.377 0 1 
y2003 y2003 = 1 for year 2003 4068 0.333 0.471 0 1 
y2004 y2004 = 1 for year 2004 4068 0.333 0.471 0 1 
Jan, Feb, Mar, 
Apr, May, Jul, 
Aug, Sep, Oct, 
Nov, Dec   
Each month dummy takes 1 in that particular month otherwise 0.   4068 0.083 0.276 0 1 
paxno the number of passengers carried by China Eastern in a market in 
a given month 
3661 6020.447 7371.054 26 71645 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics for China Southern’s data 
Variable Description  Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
War War = 1 if China Southern is experiencing a war  2451 0.057 0.232 0 1 
Collusion collusion = 1 if China Southern is participating in collusion 2450 0.091 0.288 0 1 
oaptshare market share for China Southern at departure airport 2736 0.355 0.182 0.021212 0.879227 
oapthhi Herfindahl–Hirschman index of departure airport 2736 2902.162 909.064 1261.177 7844.215 
czrouteshare share of China Southern in a route market 2736 0.581 0.273 0 1 
mnc average route market contact 2736 41.154 31.549 0 115 
distance route distance 2736 1214.237 650.549 452 3836 
tourismroute tourismroute = 1 if a market is a tourism market 2736 0.263 0.440 0 1 
busyapt busyapt = 1 if the departure airport handled 10, 000,000 passengers in 
2004 
2736 0.552 0.497 0 1 
hubtohub hubtohub = 1 if a market links China Eastern‘s primary or secondary 
hubs 
2736 0.211 0.408 0 1 
sarsdummy Sarsdummy = 1 for periods of May and June 2003  2736 0.056 0.229 0 1 
ca ca = 1 if Air China is present in a market 2736 0.188 0.391 0 1 
mu mu = 1 if China Eastern is present in a market 2736 0.498 0.500 0 1 
fm fm = 1 if Shanghai Airlines is present in a market 2736 0.271 0.444 0 1 
zh zh = 1 if Shenzhen Airlines is present in a market 2736 0.033 0.178 0 1 
hu hu = 1 if Hainan Airlines is present in a market 2736 0.206 0.405 0 1 
y2003 y2003 = 1 for year 2003 2736 0.333 0.471 0 1 
y2004 y2004 = 1 for year 2004 2736 0.333 0.471 0 1 
Jan, Feb, Mar, 
Apr, May, Jul, 
Aug, Sep, Oct, 
Nov, Dec   
Each month dummy takes 1 in that particular month otherwise 0.   2736 0.083 0.276 0 1 
paxno the number of passengers carried by China Southern in a market in a 
given month 
2576 7408.702 7657.076 145 48744 
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Table 3 Price war and successful collusion determinants for China Eastern 
 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Marginal 
Effect 
(dy/dx) 
 Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
Marginal 
Effect 
(dy/dx) 
Dependent variable: war Dependent variable: collusion 
oaptshare 0.216 0.369  oaptshare 0.096 0.328  
oapthhi 0.008* 0.004 0.001 oapthhi 0.014*** 0.004 0.002 
murouteshare -0.427* 0.228  murouteshare -0.205 0.213  
mnc -0.001 0.002  mnc -0.001 0.002  
distance 0.011 0.008  distance 0.001 0.007  
tourismroute 0.408*** 0.095 0.040 tourismroute -0.144 0.092  
busyapt 0.352*** 0.120 0.027 busyapt 0.059 0.109  
hubtohub 0.189 0.142  hubtohub -0.224* 0.131 -0.024 
sarsdummy -0.043 0.244  sarsdummy 0.847*** 0.167 0.171 
ca -0.300** 0.118 -0.020 ca -0.042 0.095  
cz 0.212** 0.108 0.018 cz 0.155 0.096  
fm -0.276** 0.129 -0.019 fm 0.131 0.118  
hu 0.076 0.106  hu 0.149 0.096  
y2003 0.273** 0.116 0.023 y2003 0.054 0.129  
y2004 -0.024 0.120  y2004 0.444*** 0.116 0.057 
Jan -0.525* 0.288 -0.027 Jan 0.494*** 0.163 0.085 
Feb 0.069 0.206  Feb -0.283 0.182  
Mar 0.270 0.198  Mar -0.273 0.180  
Apr -0.232 0.224  Apr 0.439*** 0.152 0.072 
May    -0.367** 0.231 -0.026 May 0.148 0.139  
Jul 0.277 0.202  Jul -0.271 0.182  
Aug -0.026 0.234  Aug -0.139 0.186  
Sep   -0.157 0.249  Sep -0.290 0.195  
Oct  -0.508** 0.240 -0.027 Oct -0.130 0.170  
Nov     0.389** 0.195 0.040 Nov -0.636*** 0.211 -0.050 
Dec 0.227 0.200  Dec -0.230 0.176  
paxno -0.002 0.001  paxno 0.000 0.001 0.000 
_cons  -2.159 0.262  _cons -2.081 0.222  
Summary statistics: 
1.Number of observations = 3263 
2. Log likelihood = –18249.96 
3. Wald test of overall significance: 
chi-square(27) = 104.16*** 
 
 
Summary statistics: 
1.Number of observations = 3263 
2. Log likelihood = –18464.55 
3.Wald test of overall significance: 
chi-square(27) = 198.08*** 
 
 
*Significant at 10%;**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
Instruments: number of carriers, geometric means of populations and of GDPs per capita of route endpoints. 
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Table 4 Price wars and successful collusion determinants for China Southern 
 Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
Margina
l Effect 
(dy/dx) 
 
Coef. 
Std. 
Err. 
Marginal 
Effect 
(dy/dx) 
Dependent variable: war Dependent variable: collusion 
oaptshare 0.499 0.347  oaptshare -0.128 0.293  
oapthhi -0.005 0.006  oapthhi -0.007 0.006  
czrouteshare 0.241 0.270  czrouteshare -0.183 0.222  
mnc 0.006** 0.002 0.000 mnc -0.003 0.002  
distance 0.027*** 0.009 0.002 distance 0.000 0.007  
tourismroute 0.214** 0.104 0.018 tourismroute 0.003 0.097  
busyapt -0.069 0.113  busyapt -0.027 0.093  
hubtohub -0.488*** 0.162 –0.030 hubtohub -0.142 0.112  
sarsdummy -1.033*** 0.310 –0.036 sarsdummy 0.664*** 0.205 0.131 
ca 0.250* 0.133 0.022 ca 0.057 0.119  
mu 0.288* 0.172 0.023 mu 0.348** 0.154 0.046 
fm -0.032 0.146  fm -0.086 0.133  
zh -0.084 0.134  zh 0.645*** 0.235 0.127 
hu 0.363*** 0.134 0.034 hu 0.460*** 0.120 0.075 
y2003 0.157 0.134  y2003 0.390*** 0.127 0.056 
y2004 -0.127 0.128  y2004 0.581*** 0.115 0.087 
Jan -0.988*** 0.314 -0.037 Jan 0.651*** 0.196 0.126 
Feb -0.144 0.202  Feb 0.344* 0.191 0.055 
Mar -0.191 0.207  Mar -0.301 0.232  
Apr 0.670*** 0.237 -0.032 Apr 0.816*** 0.178 0.168 
May -0.130 0.208  May 0.240 0.173  
Jul 0.298* 0.216 -0.018 Jul 0.261 0.193  
Aug -0.238 0.210  Aug -0.327 0.235  
Sep -0.486** 0.225 -0.026 Sep -0.122 0.213  
Oct -0.843*** 0.265 -0.036 Oct 0.312 0.192  
Nov -0.203 0.206  Nov 0.084 0.207  
Dec -0.597** 0.230 -0.030 Dec -0.310 0.236  
paxno -0.004*** 0.001 0.000 paxno -0.005*** 0.001 -0.001 
_cons -1.995*** 0.315  _cons -1.558*** 0.272  
        
Summary statistics: 
1.Number of observations = 2451 
2.Log likelihood = –13437.81 
3.Wald test of overall significance: 
chi-square(28) = 105.51*** 
 
 
Summary statistics: 
1.Number of observations = 2450 
2. Log likelihood = –13614.99 
3.Wald test of overall significance: 
chi-square(28) = 179.58*** 
 
 
 
*Significant at 10%;**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
Instruments: number of carriers, geometric means of populations and of GDPs per capita of route endpoints. 
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Figure 1 Price wars and collusion on route Guangzhou-Hefei 
 
 
Figure 2 Distribution of duration of price wars and collusion in China Eastern’s markets 
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Figure 3 Distribution of duration of price wars and collusion in China Southern’s markets  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Distribution of duration of price wars and collusion (alternative definitions) in 
China Eastern’s markets 
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Figure 5 Distribution of duration of price wars and collusion (alternative definitions)  in 
China Southern’s markets  
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Figure 6 Number of price wars and collusive conduct episodes in China Eastern’s markets 
(base definition) 
 
Figure 7 Number of price wars and collusive conduct episodes in China Eastern’s markets 
(alternative definitions) 
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Figure 8 Number of price wars and collusive conduct episodes in China Southern’s markets 
(base definition) 
 
 
Figure 9 Number of price wars and collusive conduct episodes in China Southern’s markets 
(alternative definition) 
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